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Abstract—In dynamic and uncertain environments such as
healthcare, where the needs of security and information availabil-
ity are difficult to balance, an access control approach based on a
static policy will be suboptimal regardless of how comprehensive
it is. The uncertainty stems from the unpredictability of users’
operational needs as well as their private incentives to misuse
permissions. In Role Based Access Control (RBAC), a user’s
legitimate access request may be denied because its need has
not been anticipated by the security administrator. Alternatively,
even when the policy is correctly specified an authorised user
may accidentally or intentionally misuse the granted permission.
This paper introduces a novel approach to access control under
uncertainty and presents it in the context of RBAC. By taking
insights from the field of economics, in particular the insurance
literature, we propose a formal model where the value of
resources are explicitly defined and an RBAC policy (entailing
those predictable access needs) is only used as a reference point to
determine the price each user has to pay for access, as opposed to
representing hard and fast rules that are always rigidly applied.
Keywords-Access Control, Authorisation, Dynamic Environ-
ments, Economics, Insider Problem, Incentives, Budget.
I. INTRODUCTION
Access control is challenging in an organisational setting
because on one hand employees need enough access to per-
form their jobs, while on the other hand more access will
bring about an increasing risk of misuse - either intentionally,
where an employee uses the access for personal benefit, or
unintentionally through carelessness, losing the information
or being socially engineered to give access to an adversary
[1], [2]. The ultimate goal of an access control system is to
allocate each user the level of access they need to do their job
- no more and no less. We refer to such allocation of access
permissions as being optimal.
Dynamic environments such as healthcare exhibit three
characteristics that challenge the applicability of classical
access control approaches. First, there is the requirement that
“nothing must interfere with the delivery of care” [2], [3] -
this implies that an access request can not be simply denied
because it was not explicitly authorised in the predefined
policy. Second, the policy writer (e.g., the administrator) has
incomplete information about the users’ operational ‘need to
know’, hence the policy is at best an approximation of true
access requirements. Third, timely access to information is of
crucial importance hence, requests may not be delayed until
manually verified. In the face of these characteristics, any
access decision based on a static security policy that binds
access rights to users on the basis of predefined operational
needs and assumed unlikelihood of misuse is doomed to be
ineffective [4], [2], [5], [6].
This contention is supported by the results of several studies
[2], [7], [8], including an empirical study of record access logs
of eight Norwegian hospitals by Røstad et al., [9], [3] which
suggests that classical RBAC is unduly restrictive for health-
care. Røstad et al. report that clinicians’ use of an exception
handling mechanism that can override access requests denied
by the static RBAC policy (i.e., if staff decide such information
is necessary) is widespread. Indeed, they found that 17% of all
record accesses occurred through the exception mechanism.
Although introducing exceptions enhances flexibility, use of
exceptions must be regularly audited to ensure they are not
misused. However, due to the dynamic nature of healthcare
and the static nature of the policy, it turns out that the use of
exceptions is hardly an exception (i.e., 74% of the staff were
assigned the permission to override denied access requests and
54% of active health records accessed in a one month period
had been accessed as an exception [9]). They report, the sheer
number of accesses via exception has made monitoring and
misuse detection/prevention an impractical task. As a result,
those staff who either maliciously or inadvertently misuse their
access rights are unlikely to be held accountable [10], [5], [11].
This paper is motivated by the shortcomings of RBAC when
uncertainty is present. More precisely, we are concerned with
settings where operational needs and a user’s incentives to
misuse resources are only partially known by the administrator
while constructing an RBAC policy. We propose a novel
approach to access control by adopting an existing RBAC
policy as a reference point for permission price discrimination
between users, rather than directly making an authorisation
decision. Through this, those users who possess a permission
based on an existing RBAC policy would pay a discounted
price for a permission, while others pay an elevated taxed
price. In order to pay for accesses, users are provided with
a limited budget, allocated according to the administrator’s
current knowledge of each user’s operational needs. However,
as users interact with the system the budget may be adjusted
(i.e., reduced or increased) based on each user’s type which
reflects their propensity to misuse their budget.
Our proposal has several benefits: First, it makes possible
the specification of an upper-bound on the damage any user
may inflict in any period. For example, regardless of the
number of database records a role (e.g., nurse) potentially
has access to via its assigned permissions, a nurse can only
access as many records as they have budget for. The proposal
can therefore prevent a large scale ‘record dump’. Second,
it directly promotes users’ accountability and steps towards
the alignment of users’ preferences such that they chose to
observe the principle of least privilege. For instance, given
two alternative mediums to access a record, (e.g. a more
secure managed workstation or a less secure personal smart
phone), where the former is cheaper, we will show that users
with limited budget can be voluntarily directed towards using
the cheaper, more secure option. Third, it allows users to
gain permissions that have not been preassigned to them
(i.e., due to the incomplete knowledge of the administrator).
Four, through budget monitoring, it provides a uniform and
efficient misuse detection/prevention mechanism. Where audit
resources (e.g., time) are constrained, the auditor can primarily
focus on verifying the access usage of users whose budget is
exhausted, rather than needing to verify all exceptions. Fifth,
the implementation of the proposed model can be seamless as
it does not modify RBAC, but adopts it and introduces new
components that can be implemented as plug-ins.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section II we pro-
vide an account of the current literature, focusing on recent
approaches that implicitly attempt to address the optimality
problem in access control. Section III formally defines the
notion of value (cost) of permissions and its implications on
standard RBAC. It shows how by using a role’s costs as
the multiplier for access cost we can nudge users to activate
less powerful roles and adhere to the least privilege princi-
ple. Section IV defines the concept of escalation in RBAC,
through which users can acquire unassigned permissions. It
also introduces two mechanisms, namely access discrimination
and budget allocation that together ensure: 1) the upper-bound
cost each user may incur is explicitly accounted for, 2) the
cost of access is determined in part by their job function,
and 3) a user’s budget is parameterised by the history of
outcomes of their prior choices (i.e., misuses). In Section
V we provide an informal account of the attacks that can
be detected/prevented using the proposed model. Finally, we
provide a brief description of potential future directions in
Sections VI and the conclusion in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
The optimal allocation of access permissions proves to be
a complex task in practice. In [1], Zhao et al. employed
the empirical results from [2], the study of access control
in financial institutions, to provide an intriguing discussion
of such complexities. They coined the terms over-entitlement
and under-entitlement of employees and suggested that an
information governance approach is required, which provides
incentives such that employees’ self-interested behaviour can
result in a firm’s optimal use of information. Their recent
formalisation [12] is directly inspired by theoretical techniques
to address the principal-agent problem in the field of eco-
nomics. Despite our interest in the general direction of such
a solution, their model is abstract and does not directly relate
to any of the existing access control models. They also make
some assumptions that may be difficult to address in practice:
Similar to the game theoretic access control model proposed
by Salim et al. [13], they assume it is possible to quantify
the benefit of opportunities that can be seized by allowing
employees to escalate (increase) their access permissions.
The risk-based approach to access control has emerged re-
cently to address the under-entitlement problem flagged by the
JASON report [5]. Cheng et al. [6] proposed a Risk-Adaptive
Access Control (RAC) based on Bell-LaPadulla’s Multilevel
Security model (MLS) [14]. They introduce a flexible gap
between allow and deny, where transactions that are denied
in the MLS model may be allowed using some additional
risk mitigation mechanisms. Following the JASON report, they
adopt the notion of risk tokens which token-holders can trade
for extra permissions. A shortcoming of their approach lies
in their basing the allocation of risk tokens on a subject’s
clearance level - the higher the clearance level, the more risk
tokens they receive. A problem arises when a high clearance
individual decides to misuse such privileges. With a large
allocation they can do considerable (though bounded) damage.
Also, their model does not deal with over-entitlement to ensure
those with current access to resources can not misuse their
privileges. Furthermore, their formal framework is based on
MLS, where objects are categorised based on their sensitivity
level. However, in models such as RBAC such categorisation
is unavailable. Not withstanding these criticisms they have
proposed a novel approach.
The inclusion of risk in more practical models such as
RBAC is a relatively new topic. Early attempts to make this
connection are taken by Dimmock et al. [15], and Jøsang et
al. [16], who combine trust management and access control by
demonstrating how RBAC can be extended to make decisions
on the basis of trust and risk analysis rather than on credentials
alone. Motivated by the fact that allocation of access rights
in RBAC is often based on inherited institutional practice,
Nissanke et al. [17], introduced a formal risk ordering relation
between pairs of permissions possibly belonging to different
roles. Their model considers the relative risks associated with
situations when users belonging to different roles perform a
similar task. Through this, delegation of permissions from one
role to another is parameterised by the associated risk. The
major criticism of their approach, which also forms part of
the motivation for our work is that their notion of risk is
static and assumed to be driven from the difference between
roles. While this approach may have some applications, in
general it ignores the risk associated with users. Celikel et
al. [10], introduced a risk-based approach to access control
in the context of database systems. Their work is mainly
concerned with the risk of role misuse (e.g., repetitive query
submission). They introduce the notion of occurrence rating
that binds the probability of a misuse to the number of times a
query has been submitted by the user. However, the proposed
approach only focuses on the over-entitlement problem. Liu
et al. [18] also address over-entitlement by assigning a risk
budget for jobs and rewarding those employees who perform
their tasks while consuming less than the allocated budget and
punishing those who exhaust their budget before completing
their tasks. In this way, the risk is communicated to the user
and the cost of risky actions is shifted from the organisation
to them. While their proposal is related to ours, it falls short
of a formal model. Furthermore, in their proposal users are
only charged against their risk budgets when their access is
considered to be an exception. Hence, users’ misuses of their
already assigned permissions cannot be accounted for. Finally,
reward and punishment are external to their model and simply
assumed to be effecting users’ behaviour.
III. THE MODEL
The problem that we address in this paper is how an admin-
istrator of an RBAC system can allocate a task (i.e., unassigned
permissions) to a user when the undesirable consequences
of the execution of the task is contingent upon the ex ante
unknown type of the user. Intuitively, binding the consequence
to an unknown parameter (type) introduces the uncertainty that
exists in access control due to unpredictability about future
user behaviour. For the rest of this paper we consider the
notion of type to embody any private information affecting
users’ preferences over how to use the permissions. We assume
the type space of users to be a spectrum from benevolent to
malicious, where allocating a task to a benevolent (malicious)
user will have the least (worst) undesirable consequence.
The rest of this section provides a formal approach to define
and annotate the notion of undesirable consequence to tasks,
and elucidate the implication of such explicit specification on
the core RBAC model.
A. Task Consequences
Following the standard RBAC terminologies, the set of
resources that are subject to access control is referred to by O,
the set of operations (actions) that can be performed on objects
by A, the set of all possible operations on objects is referred to
as tasks, T = A×O, and the set of all users by U. Let the set
of possible and relevant undesirable consequences of tasks to
be exhaustive and incompatible (i.e., C =∑ni=1 ci) and there
be a total order  on C. We write ci  cj to mean that the
consequence ci is costlier than cj . Given this, for simplicity we
assume there exists a mapping function that assigns a value1
(cost) to the consequences.
cost : C → R+ s.t.
cost [ci ] ≥ cost [cj ]⇐⇒ ci  cj , ∀i, j. (1)
Let the users’ type space to be Θ =
{malicious , benevolent} and the administrator’s uncertainty
about a user’s (u) type to be modelled as a probability
measure on Θ, provided by a probability distribution function
1We use $ sign when referring to the cost value. However note that defining
the unit of “value” is context dependant and we consider it to be the job of
a policy writers to determine the proper unit for their particular context.
ΓuΘ ∈ [0, 1]
2
. For example, ΓuΘ = {0.5, 0.5} suggests that a
given user (u) might be either malicious or benevolent with
the probability of 1/2. Given a type space Θ, we say the
possible undesirable consequences of a task are contingent
upon the type of the user - capturing the dependency of
the consequences on how the task is misused. Formally the
relation between task, type and consequences is defined as:
f : T×Θ→ C. (2)
Hence, since a combination of a task t ∈ T and a type θ ∈ Θ
will produce a particular consequence c ∈ C (i.e., [t, θ]→ c =
f [t, θ]), for each task there exists a subset of consequences
based on the possible types (eq. 2). Further, since any subset
of C has a maximum cost (eq. 1), it naturally follows that for
any task a maximum cost can be determined. Formally, we
write as max
C
[t] (read, the maximum cost of t):
max
C
: T→ R+ s.t.
max
C
[t] = ci ⇐⇒ ∀θ ∈ Θ, 6 ∃f [t, θ] = cj ∧ ci < cj .
(3)
The process of quantifying the maximum cost of an oper-
ation on those resources that have intrinsic value is intuitive.
For instance if we are designing an access control system to
utilise access to resources such as printer, the cost of a task
“print a document” can be defined and automated as: the unit
cost of print per page (e.g., $0.1), times the number of pages
in the document.
The explicit quantification of the maximum cost of an
operation on information resources that do not have an intrinsic
value can also be determined by the same logic, even though
it may be less intuitive. The value of these resources depends
on the potential cost of misuse. For example the cost to
reconstruct lost data, restore the integrity of the fabricated
or intercepted data or pay the functional liabilities for public
disclosure of confidential or private data [6], [5].
Example: Let Alice be an administrator in Sina hospital,
managing a consumer database, which provides two tasks for
the hospital staff member, t1: access up to ten rows, t2: access
a table (of up to 100 rows). For now assume that Alice is
only concerned about potential privacy breaches that would
potentially cost $2 per record (i.e., the expense to comply with
breach notification laws). Alice knows that a staff can be either
benevolent or malicious, Θ = [benevolent,malicious] where
benevolent does not breach the privacy policy but malicious
does. Hence, the universal set of consequences would be C =
[20, ..., 200]. Clearly the potential consequences of each task
are as follows: t1 = [0, . . . , 20] and t2 = [0, . . . , 200]. Hence,
max
C
[t1] = $20 and max
C
[t2] = $200.
Furthermore, if Alice knows that the database contains
records of popular individuals (e.g., politicians), the breach
of which induces x times of a typical record, the cost of
these specific records (rows), therefore the task of accessing
2The binary type space is for simplicity. In reality, type space is application
dependant and usually captures the possible relevant use/misuse (actions),
the undesirable consequences of which we may be concerned about, e.g.,
corrupting the record, publicizing the information, etc.
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Figure 1: Graphical Representation of States and Consequences.
them can be set as such. Note that there is no restriction on
the method or the granularity of cost assignment. One can
envisage a more comprehensive set of rules, where given a
matrix of records Di,j and an operation, a costs matrix Ci,j is
produced such that each cell has a cost.
The explicit assignment of (maximum) cost to tasks, even
though an approximate measure, has two important advan-
tages. It approximately quantifies the potential upper-bound
cost that any task may incur. More importantly, it provides
a basis for a relative comparison of tasks. Formally, we can
extend the relation  to also be applied on the set T:
t  t′ ⇐⇒ max
C
[t] ≥ max
C
[t′] ∀t, t′ ∈ T. (4)
Given eq. 4 and Example III-A, we can deduce that t2  t1
(the maximum cost of t2 is grater than t1). To elucidate
the implications of the above exposition let us apply it to
the standard RBAC model. In RBAC users can be either
unauthorised or authorised (Θ = {0 , 1}). Since the notion
of consequence is not expressible within the model, access
decisions are based on the types of users, rather than on
consequences of tasks in question. This would inherently mean
that consequences are binary as well, either acceptable or
unacceptable (C = {0 , 1}). As Figure 1a illustrates such
a binary representation is unable to express the distinction
between tasks in any unauthorised (authorised) state: the cost
of t1, t2 (if) used via exception by a user is indistinguishable.
Example: Assume Bob is an intern at Sina hospital with no
authorisation to perform either t1 or t2. An emergency arises
and Bob must access one of the patients record. Obviously,
providing an exceptional access to execute a task with lower
potential consequence (t1) is preferable. This is what is re-
ferred to as most-tolerable-privilege [19]. As shown in Figure
1b, such a distinction can be made when the upper-bound cost
of tasks is explicit.
r1
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Figure 2: Derivation of a Role’s Weight.
B. Role Weights
A role is a logical grouping of tasks, required for performing
a particular job function. The set of all roles is denoted
by R and the set of all predefined task-role associations is
referred to as permissions: P ⊆ T×R. Since roles may differ
both in terms of the quantity and the quality of their tasks
(i.e., the extent of undesirable consequences if misused), the
designers of RBAC suggested in [20] that “powerful roles can
be kept dormant until they are needed, to provide an element
of least privilege and safety”. However, so far they could only
informally state the concept of roles’ power (weight), as the
model does not allow it to be formally defined. This notion is
naturally captured when the tasks are explicitly annotated with
their maximum cost (eq. 3) - a role’s weight corresponds to the
cost of its associated tasks. There are however several options
available to compute a role’s weight. Here we use arithmetic
summation over the cost of the role’s tasks3. This guarantees
the cost of a role is at least equal to its most costly task while
reflecting the cheaper tasks too. Figure 2 illustrates role’s cost
as the aggregate cost of their assigned tasks (permissions). It
can be seen that taking the cost of a role to be the cost of
its most costly task would provide an inaccurate picture by
implying that roles r2 and r3 to have equal weight. Formally,
max
W
[r] =
∑
∀t∈T|(t,r)∈P
max
C
[t]. (5)
An explicit quantification of a role’s weight can be used to
provide a notion of priority for administrative functions such
as role activity monitoring and audit, but more importantly
it can also be utilised as a disincentive to motivate users to
perform their tasks through cheaper roles whenever possible.
This was one of the motivations for introducing the concept of
sessions in RBAC, which enables a user to activate only those
roles necessary to complete their jobs [20]. So far, however,
this desire could not be enforced in RBAC as users did not
have anything at stake if they did not follow the policy.
C. Price of Permissions
In RBAC users are assigned to the roles (UA ⊆ U×R), and
they are only authorised to execute those tasks that have been
3An alternative is to take the most costly task of the role, similar to our ap-
proach in determining the cost of tasks. However, it undermines the distinction
between tasks and roles: tasks have mutually exclusive consequences, while
roles may be composed of many tasks inducing a union of their consequences.
allocated to their preassigned roles:
execute[t , r ] ⇐⇒ ∃(t, r) ∈ P ∧ ∃(u, r) ∈ UA. (6)
Since user-role and role-task relationships are many to many, a
user may be able to perform a task through more than one role
(e.g., in Figure 2, t1 is available through r1 as well as r2). It
is important to motivate users towards using cheaper roles to
perform their tasks, (e.g., administrators should use their root
account only when they cannot perform their tasks through
their low privilege staff account). To achieve this we use the
weight of a role as the multiplier for the task that is being
accessed through the role. Note however, since each task has
already contributed to the weight of a role (eq. 5), multiplying
or summing the role’s weight (max
W
[r]) by the task’s cost
(max
C
[t]) double counts the cost of the task. To make this
clear, consider a role that has only one task (i.e., in Figure
2, using t2 through r3). If simple multiplication (addition) is
used to derive the roles weight, the task (t2) would cost $100
or ($20) even though the weight of r3 is driven directly from
t2. To address this, we use the following equation that ensures
the cost of a task is increased only by the proportion of the
cost of other tasks that are associated with the role:
max
C
[t, r] =

 maxW [r]
max
C
[t] + 
− 1

+max
C
[t]
s.t. (t, r) ∈ P,  > 0.
(7)
Intuitively the max
C
[t, r] is the cost of executing a task t
through the role r,  is a negligible non-zero constant to ensure
the validity of the operation if the cost of the task is zero.
Hence, when a task can be accessed through more than one
role, the roles can be compared in terms of their effect on the
cost of the task, e.g., given eq. 7 and Figure 2, executing t2
would be costlier through r2 (i.e.,$11.5) than r3 (i.e., $10).
To show the implication of eq. 7 on RBAC model, let us
briefly jump ahead and introduce the concept of budget, a
virtual currency allocated to users by the administrator (the
budget function will be formally introduced in Section IV-B).
Let budget be the only means through which users may pay
for the tasks they would like to execute. Assume that a user’s
budget is limited and non forgeable. All other things being
equal, since the more budget a user has the more task execution
capability they acquire, all users, regardless of their type
(i.e., malicious, benevolent, etc.) prefer more budget to less
budget. It then follows that when the only discriminating factor
between two roles is their price, users prefer the cheaper role
to perform their task.
This is an important phenomena, as it indirectly connects
the observance of the principle of least privilege with users’
utility. Here users’ incentives to perform their job with least
budget consumption is aligned with the access provider’s
incentive to enforce the least privilege principle (i.e., users
use less powerful roles). Moreover, since the cost of a role is
proportional to the number of its tasks, it follows that for users
who are assigned to roles, the unnecessary permissions (i.e.,
tasks assigned to the roles) are no longer considered as “free
permissions”. This is in contrast to current practice where it is
beneficial to users to overestimate the permissions they need
to perform their job and demand that administrators assign as
many permissions to the roles as possible [5], [2]. Intuitively,
users and administrators have incentives to cooperate and
determine an optimal allocation of permissions to roles.
IV. ESCALATION CAPABILITY
In RBAC users can only execute those tasks that have been
preassigned to them by the administrator (eq. 6). However, as
stated earlier, administrators usually have incomplete knowl-
edge about users’ access needs and there may be situations
where a user needs to perform a task they do not have per-
mission for. These situations if untreated, lead to suboptimal
access decisions (i.e. under-entitlement). Of course manual
update of user-role assignments is possible, however, it is
inefficient, particularly in time-critical emergency situations
[9]. Furthermore, in many circumstances, users require only
a transient access to a role rather than permanent access.
Research shows that the approaches to satisfy such needs are
ad-hoc and usually motivate administrators to allocate more
access than necessary or forget to remove the “temporary”
assignments [5], [1], [2]. The rest of this paper is dedicated
to a formal and systematic treatment of escalation in RBAC:
escalate[u, t ] ⇐⇒ ∃(t, r) ∈ P∧ 6 ∃(u, r) ∈ UA. (8)
Intuitively, escalation is the act of executing a task through
a role that has not already been assigned to the user. This
definition is very general in the sense that it enables users
to theoretically use any of the existing tasks in the system
regardless of their intentions, ranging from addressing an
emergency situation to stealing documents. This definition of
escalation entails the well known concept of delegation, which
becomes a special case of escalation, in which, the user u
who is escalating (escalate[u, t ]) possesses a support (i.e.,
delegation certificate [21]) from another user u′ who is already
a member to the role: (u′, r) ∈ UA where (t, r) ∈ P.
We believe such a support is actually a control instrument,
to determine whether the escalation should be allowed or not.
Our definition of escalation opts for the separation of the
concept from such instruments. In an access control system
where users have to pay through their limited budget to acquire
access to resources, the most effective control instruments at
our disposal are price discrimination and budget allocation
that will be introduced in the following sections.
A. Price Discrimination
So far, we have only considered a flat pricing of permis-
sions, where all users pay the full price of the tasks they want
to access (eq. 7). This approach may be reasonable before
escalation is introduced, where regardless of how much budget
a user possessed, the tasks they could access were strictly
limited to those the administrator had preassigned to them (eq.
6). However, when escalation is allowed, flat pricing has an
important drawback: the users who perform jobs that involve
costly tasks must be allocated a great deal of budget. These
users then pose a great threat as they can easily escalate to
get any permission that costs less than their highly elevated
allocated budget, (i.e., we note that RAC [6] suffers from this
limitation).
To address this problem, we adopt two price discrimination
instruments to introduce a variable pricing for permissions:
discount, α ∈ [0, 1], and tax, β ≥ 1. Conceptually, these
two allow an identical permission to be transacted at dif-
ferent prices for users based on their likelihood to misuse
the permission. Although a precise determination of such
likelihood is generally impossible as a user’s type is private,
one plausible criteria is the predefined operational needs. In
an RBAC system, the RBAC policy provides the reference
point to decide whether a user “needs” to perform the task
(i.e defined through user-role-permission relationships). Given
this, we can use this policy for discounting executions (eq. 6)
and taxing escalations (eq. 8), i.e., when the administrator has
not already predicted users’ access need. Hence, the price a
user has to pay for performing a task is no longer the flat rate
of the task’s maximum cost. Instead, it is adjusted to reflect a
user’s assumed eligibility based on the policy. Formally,
price[t , r ] =
{
max
C
[t, r].α if execute[u, t ]
max
C
[t, r].β if escalate[u, t ]
(9)
The discount rate (α) determines the portion of the actual
price that members of a role must pay to execute the task.
For example, α = 0.1 suggests that members receive 90%
discount. Theoretically it is possible for α = 0, suggesting
total discount, however, the model would be more expressive
for α > 0. One the other hand, sometimes we may need to
prohibit or make escalations very unattractive for users. For
instance, when two roles r1 and r2 are subject to separation of
duty constraints. To enforce this, the cost of such escalations
can be raised to an unattainable level through elevated tax
rates, β > 1.
Determining the tax/discount rate is application specific and
can be made very elaborate by taking into account several
factors including the roles a user already possesses and the
relevance of these roles and the role that is being used for
escalation. For instance, a doctor’s escalation to read the
medical record of a patient’s parents may be considered as
“relevant”, hence taxed substantially less than such escalation
by a finance manager. We envisage that role mining techniques
such as [22] may be adopted for deriving tax rates, however
we defer a discussion on such extensions for future work.
Example: Consider Figure 3, let Bob (intern) be a member
of roles r2 and r3 but not r1. Assume that the administrator
knows that interns normally require $20 budget to perform
their job within a period of a week, and let α = 0.1,
β = 2. Given these, Bob can use t2 through either r2 for
18 times, or through r3 for 19 times weekly to perform
his jobs. However, assume that Bob wants to access the
task t1, either due to an unexpected legitimate need (e.g.,
an emergency) or maliciously (e.g., curiosity or to sell the
u
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15
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10
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5
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10
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10
Figure 3: Role Escalation.
information). Given Bob’s budget and the cost of escalation
(eq. 9), he has an option to perform t1, but enacting such an
exception (escalation) would exhaust his budget for the period.
We will leave the discussion on implications and approaches
to handling early budget exhaustion to Section V.
B. Budget Allocation
The ability of users to escalate or execute a task, regard-
less of their intentions, is limited by their available budget.
Therefore, it is clear that the appropriate allocation of budget
is a powerful tool for both ensuring operability as well as
bounding users’ misuse capability. So far we have simply
assumed users are allocated a budget by the administrator. In
this section we will formally introduce how such a function
can be implemented given an existing RBAC policy.
In general, the budget that is being allocated to a user
must be equal to the total cost of the tasks the user is
supposed to perform for a given period. So the budget directly
relates to the frequency, λ ∈ N , by which users need to
execute tasks in order to perform their job. We assume that
the administrator can approximately predict such a frequency.
This assumption is similar to the standard assumption made
in the access control literature concerning the administrator’s
ability to predict users’ access needs (i.e., specifying user-
role and task-role associations). In practice λ can be coarse
grained, driven from the role itself and be the same for all users
assigned to the role, otherwise when comprehensive workflow
information is available, the allocation of budget can be user-
specific, allowing users with the same role to vary in terms
of the number of (task) executions they are entitled to (e.g.,
allowing a part-time medical staff member to be allocated a
budget that reflects the number of days they are available in the
hospital). However, regardless of the method and granularity
by which λ is determined, we formally introduce the users’
(u) allocated budget as:
B[u] =
∑
∀(u,r)∈UA
∀(t,r)∈P
λ.
(
max
C
[t, r].α
)
, ∀u ∈ U. (10)
One characteristic of a usable access control mechanism
is its ability to capture the dynamic nature of the system,
which refers to the changes in any factor that is relevant in
making access decisions. This may include changes in the
characteristics of the resources (e.g., object classification) or
changes in the need for providing access for performing jobs
(e.g., emergency situations). So far, through introducing the
notion of task cost, which can be dynamically determined
based on any application specific requirements and adjusted
through discount and tax components of the proposed access
discrimination instruments, the proposed model provides a
high degree of dynamism. Formally, using eq. 9 and eq. 10,
it can be shown that the users’ escalation power (i.e., users’
ability to escalate given their budget) is directly proportional
to α and inversely proportional to β. Hence, users’ access can
be easily discriminated based on the operational needs.
However, one crucial aspect of dynamism relates to changes
in user behaviour which is not explicitly captured in existing
models, including RBAC. These models assume there exists
an external pre-screening mechanism to determine users’ cre-
dentials. Hence the assignment of a user to a role inherently
indicates both of the following: the user’s operational access
needs, and their willingness not to misuse the permissions
associated with the role. However, even if we assume the op-
erational needs are accurately stated in the policy and remain
unchanged, users’ willingness not to misuse the permissions
can not be assumed to remain constant (i.e., user’s type is
private and may change). To address this we utilise any
feasible incomplete information, potentially driven from im-
perfect estimators4 of users’ behaviour to dynamically adjust
the budget they will be allocated (i.e., rather than only taking
into account the operational needs as in eq., 10).
Formally the function ΓuΘ, introduced in III captures the
incomplete knowledge about users behaviour. Let γ to be the
probability that a user is malicious and γ¯ the probability that
user is benevolent (i.e., ΓuΘ = {γ, γ¯}); the dynamic budget
function would be:
B∗[Γu
Θ
] =

 ∑
∀(u,r)∈UA
∀(t,r)∈P
λ.
(
max
C
[t, r].α
) (1 + γ¯ − γ) , u ∈ U.
(11)
The above budget allocation mechanism explicitly interlinks
the available knowledge about users’ types to the budget they
will be allocated. Given this, regardless of the initial estimation
of user’s required budget allocation (i.e., to complete tasks),
their future allocated budget will be automatically adjusted,
decreasing (or increasing) in proportion to perceived changes
of their type as they interact with the system.
What this approach means is that we are internalising the
concepts of punishment and reward. In other words, as the
evidence regarding user’s maliciousness increases (γ ≈ 1) the
user’s budget approximates to zero (B∗[Γu
Θ
] ≈ 0). Conversely,
as users’ demonstrate their trustworthiness (γ¯ ≈ 1) their
budget increases thereby, providing flexibility for these users
through allowing more execution/escalations without interrup-
tions (i.e., manual request for exceptional access). Although
the automatic incorporation of rewards may be an attractive
characteristic, as it reduces administration workload, it may
not be acceptable in environments where preserving security
is more important than usability. In such an environment, the
budget allocation function may simply eliminate γ¯ from the
budget equation. The particularities of the budget allocation
4Note that, even though users’ type is strictly private, the outcome of their
actions may be observed through access logs, or real-time monitoring.
function is application dependant and outside the scope of the
current paper.
V. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
Now we discuss how the adoption of proposed the model
facilitates monitoring and misuse detection and prevents some
of the common attacks that are inherently difficult to de-
tect/prevent in traditional access control models such as
RBAC.
A. Effective Monitoring
Monitoring and analysis of users’ budgets provides a uni-
form mechanism for better understanding of access needs as
well as detecting misuses. We can envisage two reasons for a
user’s budget to be prematurely exhausted.
1) Erroneous Budget Allocation: The administrator may
have incorrectly predicted a user’s access requirements for
the given period. Precisely the error in the proposed model
can be due to incorrect user-role (UA) or role-permission (P)
assignments, or under-estimation of the frequency of access
(task executions, λ). Regardless of the source of error, the
abrupt exhaustion of a user’s budget and their inability to
perform their job demands that the administrator maintain an
accurate picture of users budget needs. We envisage that in the
long-run through analysing budget spending patterns, users’
budget can be quantified with a sufficient proximity to the
actual need.
2) Permission Misuse: When the allocated budget is ade-
quate, a user’s budget exhaustion flags the potential misuse
of permissions. This feature can improve the efficiency of
monitoring and audit as the administrator can focus on those
users whose budget has been exhausted, rather than needing
to audit and verify all accesses or escalations. Note that, not
only misuses can be detected when budget is exhausted, but
also when the users ‘remaining budget’ to ’remaining duration’
ratio falls below a threshold (e.g., 0.2). This allows users
potential misuses to be detected even if they deliberately avoid
exhausting their budget. Note that when the threshold is not
common knowledge (private to administrators), strategic users
can no longer game the detection mechanism by spending their
budget only up to the threshold to avoid being detected.
B. Impersonation Attack
An outsider may acquire the credentials of an employee
and access the system. The consequences of a successful
impersonation attack in a traditional access control model
can be devastating as such attacks are difficult to detect or
prevent. The adversary can access any and all resources for
which the legitimate user held privileges without affecting the
actual user’s access capabilities. This is not the case in our
model. Even though the attack is still possible, any access
by the attacker is counted against the user’s budget. Hence,
the consequences of such attacks are strictly limited by the
available user’s budget for the period. Clearly, the damage
incurred by the attacker is directly proportional to the length
of the budget allocation period, as the budget quantity would
be smaller when it is allocated for a shorter period.
C. Denial of Service Attack (DoS)
A malicious insider may wish to prevent other users from
accessing resources by executing a denial of service attack.
The type of DoS attack most relevant to this proposal is query
flooding against databases, where the malicious user sends a
large number of select or update queries to a targeted database
[23]. Current techniques to detect/prevent such attacks require
comprehensive analysis of query log files and assumptions
about normal patterns of access that so far suffer from high
incidence of false-positives [10], [23]. In the proposed model
such attacks will have a limited impact and can be detectd,
as a user’s ability to execute tasks is bounded by their limited
budget, the exhaustion of which will lead to termination of the
attack and potentially, misuse detection.
D. Escalation Attack
One criticism of the proposed model may be that it allows
malicious users to escalate their privileges. In response we
first stress that the aggregate amount of damage that may be
incurred is restricted by the budget allocated to users. Further,
the budget allocation function is parameterised by the outcome
of online monitoring mechanisms such as intrusion detection
systems to adjust the users’ disposable budget based on their
estimated type. Third, the administrator has additional control
over the escalations through personalising the evaluations of
escalation tax (i.e., β), which could take into account the users’
application specific factors such as trustworthiness, need, and
access history into account.
VI. FUTURE WORK
Our immediate efforts to improve the proposed model focus
on investigating how role mining techniques that provide
the quantitative notion of distance between roles may be
adopted for deriving tax rates. Further, we would like to
implement the proposed model to study its effectiveness in
detecting and preventing the mentioned attacks, as well as
the administrative complexities that the cost, discount/tax and
budget specification introduces.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a novel approach to access control where
instead of making access decisions based on constructs such
as roles, the access is provided if the user can afford the
cost of the permission. We have shown how an RBAC policy
can be employed as a reference point to discriminate between
users to individualise permission costs and to allocate budget
to users. The proposed approach enforces an explicit upper-
bound on potential damage by users; it allows users to gain
unassigned permissions; it promotes the alignment of users’
preferences to observe the principle of least privilege, and
facilitates monitoring and misuse detection mechanism into the
access control model. The combination of these characteristics
contributes to the optimality of the access control approach.
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